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On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck coastal areas in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi, causing numerous deaths, massive infrastructure damage, and flooding. The two hardest hit 
areas were along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi. The State of Louisiana and the City of New 
Orleans invited the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to assist with the rebuilding of the 
city’s public health system. Between September 11, 2005, and October 29, 2005, investigators from 
CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) were deployed to New Orleans 
and Baton Rouge. Their main objectives were to assist Federal, state, and local agencies in addressing 
occupational safety and health issues, to perform health and injury surveillance and exposure assessments 
among workers, to perform outreach to vulnerable workers, and to develop and disseminate occupational 
health information. Three teams of personnel responded to numerous requests for assistance in evaluating 




Except for a limited number of noise exposure samples above the NIOSH recommended 
exposure limit and carbon monoxide levels above the NIOSH ceiling limit, 
environmental sampling for a variety of substances including asbestos, metals and dust 
did not reveal levels above recognized occupational exposure limits. A summary of the 
findings was shared with workers and employers. Safety hazards such as broken glass 
posed a risk to workers. Worksites in the flood-ravaged areas had varying degrees of 
capacity for hazard recognition, evaluation, and control. In general, the need for readily 
accessible, pertinent, understandable information regarding workplace hazards and 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck 
coastal areas in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi, causing flooding, massive 
infrastructure damage, power outages, and 
numerous deaths and injuries. The two hardest 
hit areas were along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana 
and Mississippi. 
 
The State of Louisiana and the City of New 
Orleans invited the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) to assist with the 
rebuilding of the city’s public health system. 
The CDC assembled a multidisciplinary 
collection of scientists from its various centers, 
including the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH), to respond to the 
complex public health needs of New Orleans 
and surrounding parishes. The NIOSH personnel 
staffed the Occupational Health Team, one of 
several teams (others included Communications, 
Injury, Mental Health, and Environmental 
Teams) comprising the CDC Hurricane Katrina 
response. 
 
Three Occupational Health Teams from 
CDC/NIOSH (Teams 1, 2, and 3) were deployed 
consecutively to New Orleans by the CDC 
Director’s Emergency Operations Center 
(DEOC) in Atlanta, Georgia, to support CDC’s 
mission in New Orleans. These teams consisted 
of industrial hygienists, medical officers, and 
engineers. The overall mission of these teams 
was to provide guidance on occupational health 
and safety needs and perform exposure 
assessment for workers involved in the cleanup 
and rebuilding of New Orleans and the 
surrounding parishes in the aftermath of the 
hurricane. The mission of Team 1 was to 
conduct a “needs assessment” of the situation on 
the ground by identifying hazards and 
establishing communication with various worker 
groups. Based on input from Team 1, the 
mission of Team 2 was to conduct 
environmental sampling of occupational 
exposures. The mission of Team 3 was to 
conduct outreach and provide occupational 
safety and health information to various worker 
groups. Team missions were modified as 
appropriate in response to local conditions, as 
activities occurred, and to build upon previous 
efforts. Additionally, CDC/NIOSH sent 
occupational health specialists to the Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals at their 
request to assist in providing guidance on 
worker safety, health, and exposure issues. 
 
The Worker Safety and Health Annex of the 
Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF-8), which 
is in the National Response Plan, was also put 
into effect for the first time during Hurricane 
Katrina.1  This annex describes the 
responsibilities that the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) has to assist 
Federal employees and their contractors during 
disaster recovery operations, as well as the 
support role NIOSH plays to OSHA during such 
a response. 
 
This report summarizes the occupational health 
activities of the CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina 
response personnel and highlights the findings 
and recommendations that were made to 
workers, employers, and agencies in Louisiana. 
During the wide variety of activities performed 
by CDC/NIOSH personnel, recommendations 
were made to those groups that were directly 
involved with each of the specific activities 
performed by the Occupational Health Teams. 
Where recommendations were made by 
CDC/NIOSH personnel to wear respirators, 
recommendations were also made for their 
proper use following applicable OSHA 
respiratory protection program regulations.2 
 
ACTIVITIES 
Occupational Health Team 1 
Mission: Address occupational exposure issues 
for management and union officials, workers, 
and government agencies. 
 
Between September 11 and September 29, 2005, 
Occupational Health Team 1 members 
conducted visual assessments of work activities 
throughout the New Orleans metropolitan area. 
Some of the challenges Team 1 members faced 
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included difficulties in communication, housing, 
and transportation. A major challenge for Team 
1 members was the vastness of the disaster area, 
and systematically locating sites where work 
was being carried out. To identify such sites, 
Team 1 members conducted tours throughout 
various parts of the city including suburban, 
downtown, French Quarter, and convention 
center areas to observe response and cleanup 
operations and talk to workers about their work 
activities and use of personal protective 
equipment (PPE). Many of the hazards assessed 
during this period occurred during the following 
general activities: 
 
 Entering flooded facilities to identify 
general safety hazards 
 Cleaning and sanitation activities in 
buildings and hotels 
 Tree cutting and removal of debris 
 
A variety of potential chemical exposure and 
safety hazards were found throughout many of 
the activities observed. These included 
exposures to gases such as carbon monoxide 
(CO) and hydrogen sulfide (H2S), dust and dried 
flood sediment, floodwaters, noise, mold, and 
safety hazards such as broken glass. Specific 
activities carried out by Team 1 follow. 
Carbon Monoxide and Other 
Gases 
Team 1 members responded to a request from 
the Army to assess working conditions at 
Charity Hospital. At the time, members of the 
Army and Navy were using diesel-powered 
pumps and generators to pump water out of the 
hospital’s basement morgue in order to remove 
approximately 30 bodies. A member of the Navy 
staff was monitoring the area with a four-gas 
meter (CO, H2S, oxygen [O2], and lower 
explosive limit [LEL]). Results reported to Team 
1 members were well below occupational 
exposure limits (OELs). NIOSH investigators 
made recommendations to wear hearing 
protection in the area, follow confined space 
procedures, and extend the flex-duct that carried 
diesel exhaust away from the building and 
occupied areas.  
Team 1 members made a return visit 2 days 
later. It was reported that a Navy team fully 
equipped with self-contained breathing 
apparatuses (SCBAs) had entered the basement 
the previous day and reported that the CO and 
H2S readings had peaked on their instrument 
(neither these readings nor the scale on the 
instrument were provided). Therefore, the 
removal of the bodies had not begun as they 
were looking for equipment to ventilate the 
space. It was described that the only personnel 
entering the space were trained Navy personnel. 
Recommendations were reiterated to follow 
confined space procedures while entering the 
area after they completed pumping out the 
basement.  
 
Team 1 members observed approximately 85 
workers cleaning up one of the city’s major 
hotels in the French Quarter. Gasoline-powered 
pumps were running in a low-level parking 
garage. Measurements collected by Team 1 
members using a direct-reading instrument 
showed CO levels as high as 220 parts per 
million (ppm). Team 1 members immediately 
recommended opening a garage door, which 
resulted in a decrease of CO levels to 25 ppm. 
Additionally, hearing protection, eye protection, 
and respirators were recommended for grinding 
operations also occurring on-site. It was found 
that workers at the site were not immunized 
according to CDC recommendations for 
recovery workers, so arrangements were made 
with a nearby disaster medical assistance team 
(DMAT) to give the workers appropriate 
immunizations shots such as hepatitis B and 
tetanus. 
Floodwaters and Dried Flood 
Sediment 
A major concern brought to the attention of 
Team 1 members was worker exposure to 
floodwater and the dust and dried flood sediment 
left after floodwater receded. Team 1 members 
recommended appropriate respirators to several 
New Orleans area agencies, including Jefferson 
Parish Emergency Medical Service (EMS), U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), National 
Park Service (NPS), and the City of New 
Orleans.  
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Team 1 members and USACE officials visually 
assessed the work areas at the 17th Street Canal, 
where one of the major levee breaks occurred. 
Worker concerns included potential exposures to 
the dust from disturbing dried flood sludge or 
river mud. Concerns were also expressed about 
exposures to biological matter in the floodwater 
aerosol generated by aerators returning 
floodwater to Lake Pontchartrain. Team 1 
members recommended that workers avoid close 
proximity to the aerators that shoot spray 15–25 
feet above the water surface and that those who 
work near or downwind from aerators be 
provided with NIOSH-certified N-95 respirators. 
Recommendations were also provided regarding 
excavator and earth-moving activities at the 
broken levee site. Team 1 members observed an 
excavator operator moving dirt and gravel 
(crushed rock) in the area, prompting concerns 
of exposure to airborne silica. The operator was 
working in an open cab, transferring material 
with a bucket. Until an exposure assessment was 
completed, Team 1 members recommended that 
the worker wear a half-mask, NIOSH-certified 
N-95 respirator and follow all applicable OSHA 
respirator requirements, including medical 
evaluation and fit testing.2   
 
Workers were observed at a pump station on a 
canal near the Murphy oil spill in St. Bernard 
Parish. Because of concerns about potential 
exposure to volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs), Team 1 members recommended an 
exposure assessment in areas near oil spill 
cleanups. Team 1 members also recommended 
that, until exposure results were available, 
workers who must spend time in this area should 
be offered half-mask respirators with organic 
vapor cartridges (combined with N-100 or P-100 
filters if they were exposed to rock dust). If the 
workers reported eye irritation, Team 1 
members recommended providing them with 
full-face respirators with the same type of 
cartridges.  
 
Authorities with the NPS reported concerns for 
their workers who were performing clean-up 
work and tree trimming and removal in several 
historic sites in and around New Orleans. One of 
the primary NPS historic sites in the area was 
the Chalmette National Battlefield in St. Bernard 
Parish. Primary concerns included exposure to 
contaminants in dried floodwater sediment 
including heavy metals, silica, and hydrocarbons 
on the dust particles as a result of the Murphy oil 
spill in Chalmette and St. Bernard Parish. Tasks 
with dust exposures included mowing historic 
battlefields covered with dried sediment, 
demolition of NPS buildings and clean-up of 
historic buildings/sites, tree removal, and street 
sweeping. Interim recommendations were 
provided including providing NIOSH-certified 
N-95 respirators for workers exposed to dust. 
NPS officers requested an exposure assessment 
for particulates; Team 1 members relayed this 
request to Occupational Health Team 2. 
 
Team 1 members attended a meeting sponsored 
by the City of New Orleans about their No-
Notice Flood/Levee Breach Emergency 
Evacuation Plan, which included a safety plan 
for responders in flood-prone areas. While the 
plan addressed decontamination of personnel 
who come into contact with floodwaters, it was 
recommended that the plan also address the 
issue of PPE for response workers who came 
into contact with floodwater. Upon request, 
recommendations on PPE for workers exposed 
to floodwater were also sent to an Army 
representative present at the meeting. 
Noise 
Concerns of overexposure to noise were 
common. During the site visit to the 17th Street 
Canal worksite, large pumps were observed 
pumping water back into the canal from the 
neighborhood, and an excavator operator was 
moving large amounts of crushed gravel, 
resulting in potentially excessive noise levels. 
No hearing protection devices (HPDs) were 
provided to the workers on-site. Similar 
observations were made at other temporary 
pump station locations. Until an exposure 
assessment could be completed to quantify 
exposures, Team 1 members recommended that 
workers near the pump be provided adequate 
HPDs (foam earplugs or earmuffs with noise 
reduction rating [NRR] >27 dBA).  
 




establishment of temporary morgues 
spitals and medical care 
cilities, and shelters. 
Mold 
One of the major issues that confronted Team 1 
members was concerns about mold exposure 
during cleanup operations. Team 1 members 
provided information and recommendations to 
various groups, including the City of New 
Orleans, private businesses, and several search 
and rescue groups. Team 1 members also 
participated in discussions with other CDC 
teams on how to safely clean flood-damaged 
buildings and homes; provided technical 
assistance and information on mold cleanup to 
building managers, custodians, and others who 
were responsible for commercial building and 
school maintenance; and provided 
recommendations for the cleaning and 
remediation of flood-contaminated heating, 
ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) 
systems.3 Additionally, Team 1 members 
assisted with a press release on mold for the 
Mayor of New Orleans and provided 
information on molds, especially on PPE 
concerns, to the City of New Orleans Health 
Department.  
Safety  
A variety of safety hazards were observed 
during cleanup operations. Team 1 members 
observed a construction worker pushing glass 
windows from the 15th floor of a hotel resulting 
in shards of glass more than 1 foot in diameter 
falling to the street and sidewalk below. No 
warning signs were observed, and the area had 
not been cordoned off by the contractor, 
representing an imminent hazard of death or 
serious injury to passersby and any workers at 
street level. Recommendations were made for 
the contractor to establish a safe perimeter 
around the hazardous zone with construction 
tape, cones, and flares. A return site visit later 
that day revealed that these recommendations 
had not been implemented, illustrating the 
challenge of government oversight over the 
thousands of contractors moving into New 
Orleans for cleanup and rebuilding. 
Occupational Injury and Disease 
Surveillance  
Medical officers on Team 1 advised local and 
state officials of the potential occupational 
health risks associated with the flooding when 
working around the City of New Orleans. They 
met with New Orleans leadership, state 
leadership and federal representatives from 
OSHA, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and the National Institute for 
Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) 
concerning potential health hazards when 
returning to businesses. Sites visited by Team 1 
members included the Superdome, City Hall, 
and Tulane University Library. Team 1 members 
provided verbal recommendations and written 
materials from CDC to local and state officials, 
working groups and managers, rescue, recovery, 
and cleanup workers about the following issues: 
 
 Contaminated floodwater  
 Unclean or unstable work environments  
 Bites and scratches, rabies during 
animal rescue, dermatologic conditions, 
sharps injuries, infectious disease risks, 
insect and vector risk (including West 
Nile virus) 
 Immunization recommendations  
Work stress, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, including Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) referrals, and referrals to 
Louisiana State U
psychiatric services  
Handling human remains a
 
Additionally, Team 1 members provided 
assessment tools for others to use to assess the 
potential occupational safety and health impacts 




Offers of assistance were extended to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) 
New Orleans Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) in analyzing data they were collecting on 
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ta affecting 
ost-Katrina New Orleans workers. 
r diagnoses that occurred 
on five or more visits.  
Occupational Health Team 2 
deployed USAR team members; to the George 
Washington University Medical College in 
analyzing data they were collecting on New 
Orleans Police Department (NOPD) personnel 
who were going on leave; to the NOPD mental 
health provider; and to approximately 10 
medical units in the New Orleans area to obtain 
occupational injuries and illness da
p
 
Team 1 medical officers, through contacts made 
in the field, identified medical units at a private 
security company and the police department jail 
at the Greyhound Bus Depot. They then 
distributed worker illness and injury surveillance 
forms at these two sites. Because of required 
evacuation for Hurricane Rita, follow-up by 
Team 1 members was not possible for the 
Greyhound Bus Depot. Staff at the private 
security company medical clinic did not use the 
forms provided because they found them to be 
more complicated and time-consuming than just 
using a notebook to record information 
regarding medical visits. Their staff compiled 
the medical visit information into a Microsoft 
Excel file and provided that to Team 1 members. 
During the 25 days that this company was 
working in New Orleans (September 3–27, 
2005), there were 270 reported clinic visits 
among the 150 employees. Table 1 shows the 
presenting complaints o
Mission: Perform quantitative exposure 
assessments at worksites throughout the New 
Orleans metropolitan area and follow-up on 
contacts made by Team 1 members. 
mine the scope of illness, 
injury, and stress. 
s conditions were determined to be 
resent. 
 
Team 1 members were evacuated from New 
Orleans on September 21, 2005, in anticipation 
of Hurricane Rita. Once Hurricane Rita 
subsided, Occupational Health Team 2 was 
deployed; their work began on September 29, 
2005. Priority was placed on re-establishing 
communication with contacts made by Team 1, 
developing further contacts and cooperation with 
OSHA and USACE and its contractors working 
in the city, as well as responding to requests for 
assistance on occupational safety and health 
issues. Many of the concerns that were brought 
to the attention of Team 2 members were a 
reflection of the activities that were developing 
over time in the city’s cleanup efforts. 
Therefore, assistance with information on 
contact with floodwaters diminished, for 
example, as assistance in evaluating potential 
exposures during debris removal increased. 
Concerns about entering flooded buildings and 
potential exposure to dust and dried flood 
sediment were still prevalent. In particular, 
medical officers on Team 2 made efforts to 
locate specific populations of workers, 
particularly those who had worked through the 
days during and immediately after the 
Hurricane, to assist them in evaluating 
symptoms and to deter
Entering Flooded Buildings 
Assistance was requested from the U.S. Office 
of the Inspector General (OIG) to provide 
guidance for workers to enter the Tulane School 
of Medicine in New Orleans to remove boxes of 
patient records. Team 2 members accompanied 
OIG officers into the building. The hallway and 
the records office were intact. Because the 
ventilation and air conditioning systems had not 
been operational for over a month, the air in this 
location was noticeably stale and musty; 
however, there were no visible signs of water 
damage or mold growth. Team 2 members used 
direct reading instruments to monitor for 
airborne particulates, CO, carbon dioxide (CO2), 
total VOCs, and lower explosive limit while the 




A site visit was performed in response to a 
request from the NOPD to provide health and 
safety guidance for workers entering the NOPD 
Headquarters (HQ). The first floor of the NOPD 
HQ had been flooded with approximately 5 feet 
of water, leaving a significant amount of mold in 
the offices on that floor, which included archival 
rooms of personnel records. Team 2 members 
were briefed about concerns related to entering 
the building to retrieve and remove large 
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tivities in these areas was 
lso recommended. 
ots 
were adequate for the tasks being conducted. 
ollection, Transfer, 
r trucks and transferred to sanitary 
ndfills. 
brought onto the site was scheduled 
r burning. 
quantities of paper personnel records. Team 2 
members provided information on health issues 
related to mold exposures and guidance on 
proper PPE for working in areas contaminated 
with floodwater and mold. They accompanied 
the requesting officer into his personnel offices 
on the first floor to observe the mold 
contamination. These offices had seen 
significant floodwater damage, and large 
quantities of mold growth were observed on 
walls, chairs, and other furniture. Team 2 
members observed restoration work 
commencing in other areas of the first floor, 
including large fans intended to dry out affected 
areas. They recommended that the contractor 
install fans in offices as soon as possible to 
minimize further mold growth due to the high 
humidity levels and significant dampness still in 




Team 2 members were requested to brief federal 
and state police (Louisiana Attorney General’s 
Office; Louisiana State Police; OIG; 
Immigration, Customs, and Environmental 
[ICE] Federal Officers; Louisiana Department of 
Justice) concerning potential exposure and 
health hazards when entering Memorial Hospital 
in New Orleans to collect evidence. Team 2 
members briefed the officers concerning the 
health and exposure risks of floodwaters and 
sediment, debris, mold, odors, heat stress, work 
stress, infectious risks, and risks of handling 
human and animal remains. Additionally, the 
team provided observational site assessment of 
the second, fourth and seventh floors where 
evidence was being collected. No electricity was 
available in the building, requiring the use of 
flashlights for visibility. No water damage was 
observed on the seventh floor; on the second and 
fourth floors, signs of water damage to a number 
of ceiling tiles were observed due to overflow 
from sinks on the above floor. In addition, fallen 
wet debris around existing pipes was evident. 
Floodwaters had not reached any of these floors. 
No visible mold growth was observed during the 
assessment. Trash, debris, litter, oxygen tanks, 
and broken glass were distributed throughout the 
hallways, common rooms, and patient rooms. 
There were multiple trip hazards and sharps 
from broken glass in various areas, but no 
obvious airborne exposure hazards. A direct-
reading particulate counter was used to evaluate 
total airborne particulate levels on these three 
floors. Results were consistent with particulate 
levels observed in poorly ventilated indoor 
environments. Team 2 members concluded that 
the officers collecting evidence in the building 
needed no respiratory protection. The standard 
precautions of nitrile gloves and steel-toed bo
Flood Debris C
and Removal 
As the cleanup from Hurricane Katrina 
continued, vegetative debris and construction 
and demolition (C&D) debris from throughout 
the New Orleans metropolitan area was being 
collected and transported to transfer locations. 




One of the sites where construction/demolition 
debris from Jefferson Parish was being collected 
was in a 200-acre field adjacent to the Louis 
Armstrong New Orleans International Airport. 
The site was operated by Ceres Environmental, 
one of three main contractors with the USACE 
for debris removal. The USACE contracted the 
operation of the site to Ceres Environmental 
who subcontracted the site’s management to 
Beverly Construction. An average of 23,000 
cubic yards (yd3) of debris from throughout 
Jefferson Parish was brought onto the site each 
day by trucks under contract to Ceres. Once 
onsite, the debris was sorted to remove 
refrigerators, air conditioners, microwave ovens, 
compressed gas cylinders, and other potentially 
hazardous items. Once these items had been 
removed, 5,000 to 6,000 yd3 of the remaining 
debris (about 20%–25% of the incoming) was 
loaded onto trucks for transport to sanitary 
landfills outside of the New Orleans area. None 
of the debris 
fo
 
Work was conducted at the site for 12 hours 
(06:30 to 18:30) a day, 7 days a week. Beverly 
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re 
commended but their use was not enforced. 
investigators recommended that these employees 
Construction had an onsite staff of eight heavy 
equipment operators (trackhoes and bulldozers), 
one light equipment operator (front end loader), 
three laborers (traffic control staff), and two 
work supervisors. Eight to 10 USACE staff were 
onsite during daily operations. During a visit to 
the site, Team 2 members discussed safety 
issues with the Beverly Construction safety 
officer who raised concerns about the following 
health issues: contact dermatitis, noise 
exposures, upper respiratory irritation from dust, 
and infectious disease risks from bacteria in 
flood-contaminated debris. There were 
additional concerns about work-related stress 
because of long work shifts with minimal breaks 
and post-traumatic stress, particularly among 
those who lost homes and possessions because 
of Hurricane Katrina. At the time, the safety 
officer required the use of hard hats, safety 
glasses, and steel-toed shoes. N-95 respirators, 
hearing protection, and gloves we
re
 
Team 2 members conducted air sampling for 
total and respirable dust in the personal 
breathing zone (PBZ) of five workers. All 
samples were collected for at least 7 hours. The 
samples were sent to an American Industrial 
Hygiene Association (AIHA)-accredited 
laboratory for gravimetric and elemental (metals 
and minerals) analysis. A return site visit was 
conducted to perform asbestos and respirable 
dust/silica air sampling and noise dosimetry to 
assess potential exposures among USACE and 
Beverly Construction workers. During a portion 
of the day, the environmental conditions were 
very dusty, prompting the USACE to 
temporarily suspend operations. Following 
adequate dust suppression efforts by water tank 
spraying over a period of 2 hours, debris 
collection activities were resumed. Samples 
were collected over a 7–8 hour period of the 
work shift. Results of total and particulate dust 
sampling showed levels below occupational 
exposure limits. Personal noise dosimetry 
sampling conducted on three employees showed 
noise doses near or above the NIOSH 
recommended exposure limit (REL), but below 
the OSHA action level (AL). NIOSH 
wear hearing protection (Summary A of the 
Appendix). 
 
A site visit was conducted at a debris site at 
North Galvez and St. Louis Streets operated by 
ECC, one of the three main USACE prime 
contractors for debris removal. Team 2 members 
collected air samples and performed noise 
monitoring on personnel actively involved in the 
collection and reduction of debris. One PBZ air 
sample and three area air samples were collected 
and analyzed for total particulates with an 
additional analysis for elements (metals and 
minerals). Two area air samples were collected 
and analyzed for respirable dust with additional 
analysis for silica. The air samples were 
collected over approximately 6 hours. All air 
sample results showed levels below occupational 
exposure limits. Two bulk samples of debris pile 
dust were collected and analyzed for elements, 
asbestos, and crystalline silica (quartz and 
cristobalite). Low concentrations of minerals 
and metals were found in the bulk samples; they 
did not contain any detectable asbestos. Personal 
noise dosimetry was performed on a quality 
control (QC) inspector and a trackhoe operator 
for approximately 6 hours. All exposures were 
below the NIOSH and OSHA criteria for the 
actual time worked. Recommendations made by 
Team 2 members are in Summary B of the 
Appendix.  
 
Team 2 members performed a site visit in 
response to a request from Axis Remedial 
Services (a subcontractor to ECC) to provide 
health and safety guidance and exposure 
assessment for workers at a debris collection site 
located at Religious and Orange Streets in New 
Orleans. The site was used as a point of 
collection and separation of debris. It was the 
designated point for small dump trucks to unload 
their material for separation where it could be 
picked up by larger trucks for distribution to 
landfills. Because of the smaller quantities of 
materials the smaller trucks brought (compared 
to other sites where large trucks were directed), 
workers were able to get a better sense of what 
types of materials were coming into the site and 
separated by type of material, making the site 
unique. A worker discovered that a load dumped 
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by a truck had contained a significant quantity of 
Transite™ siding shingles, a composite material 
that could potentially contain asbestos. Team 2 
members were specifically asked to perform 
exposure monitoring for asbestos during the 
disposal activities of this material at the site 
(Summary C of the Appendix). 
 
The site manager detailed the plan he developed 
to dispose of the approximately 2 yd3 of 
Transite™ shingles that had been found. He 
planned to line a dumpster with plastic lining 
where the material was going to be placed. 
Initially, he planned to do the work by hand 
using a shovel. However, he instead directed a 
trackhoe operator to do the work mechanically. 
During the work, he wore a Tyvek® suit and an 
elastomeric half-mask respirator with P-100 
cartridges, as did the trackhoe operator. Prior to 
moving the material into the lined dumpster, it 
was wetted down with water from a nearby 
water truck to minimize aerosolization of dust 
and/or fibers. Before the activity, Team 2 
members placed sampling pumps on the 
trackhoe operator, the site manager, and another 
worker on-site, and placed a pump downwind to 
collect an area air sample. Sample results for 
fiber concentrations were non-detectable or very 
low. Although asbestos exposure was not 
identified during this assessment, conditions and 
materials may vary at other times and worksites. 
It was recommended that the employees be 
trained on hazards associated with handling 
siding and roofing materials, such as old 
Transite™ shingles, which may contain 
asbestos. It was recommended that they continue 
to assess the need for respirators as the debris 
composition and tasks vary. Respirator use 
should follow OSHA regulations even if 
voluntary use is allowed by management. A 
further recommendation was to continually use 
water sprays to minimize aerosolized dust.  
 
Team 2 members accompanied auditors from 
FEMA to 22 locations (mainly debris collection 
sites) within Jefferson Parish to identify sites for 
possible follow-up personal/area air sampling 
and to disseminate worker safety and health 
information.  
Clean-up and Salvaging 
Operations 
Team 2 members provided technical assistance 
to the NPS regarding cleanup and salvaging 
operations at the Chalmette Battlefield and 
National Cemetery, both located in St. Bernard 
Parish. The Chalmette Battlefield and National 
Cemetery are located within a 200-acre property 
bordered by the Mississippi River to the south 
and an industrial park, including an oil refinery, 
to the east. Several buildings were damaged 
during Hurricane Katrina, including the 
superintendent’s two-story house and the 
carriage house. Both structures had been 
inundated with approximately 5 feet of water 
and were under renovation. Many trees had 
fallen and had been consolidated and were being 
made into mulch for use on site. There was no 
oil damage at this site unlike that seen in 
adjacent residential and industrial Chalmette 
properties. 
 
The NPS requestor informed Team 2 members 
that during the first couple of weeks following 
the hurricane, recovery workers had entered the 
superintendent’s house to recover artifacts and 
were protected by knee-high rubber boots, 
coveralls, gloves, and half-mask air-purifying 
respirators. At the time of the visit, efforts were 
being made to ventilate the building and dry the 
contents through use of fans powered by a 
gasoline-powered outdoor generator. 
Additionally, natural ventilation was 
accomplished by opening all operable windows. 
The water-soaked carpet had not yet been 
removed from the house. Forest Service and 
NPS workers wore leather gloves while 
removing contents of the house; N-95 respirators 
were made available. Minimal to moderate 
levels of mold and mildew were visible only on 
the first floor, most notably on the carpet. A 
large tree had fallen on the carriage house, 
damaging the roof. The roofing shingles 
contained asbestos, and the majority of damaged 
shingles were in a pile near the corner of the 
building. Warning tape circled the perimeter of 
this area, thereby restricting access. Removal of 
the shingles was scheduled as soon as possible 
pending arrival of appropriate PPE. Team 2 
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members concurred with the approach and 
recommended high efficiency-filtered half-mask 
respirators, disposable coveralls, boot coverings, 
and gloves during clean up of the asbestos-
containing material. 
Disposal of Spoiled Food 
 
Team 2 members observed workers emptying 
and cleaning freezers and refrigerators of spoiled 
food at a restaurant. The spoiled food included 
maggot-infested meat. Employees were wearing 
protective gear (Tyvek™ suits, gloves, half-face 
powered air purifying respirators) on a hot day. 
Therefore, heat stress was a potential health 
hazard for these employees. This was addressed 
by the site contractor’s health and safety officer 
who provided employees with water, a tent with 
chairs for shade, and cooling fans. 
Building Remediation and Repair 
Team 2 members visited numerous sites, 
particularly hotels, throughout the Central 
Business District where workers were 
performing remediation/reconstruction activities 
to provide information and determine the need 
for further hazard assessment. The levels of 
remediation/reconstruction were site-dependent. 
It was observed that water damage and mold 
growth were issues in the locations visited. 
There was a large number of Hispanic workers 
(many of whom spoke little to no English) 
employed by the remediation and cleanup 
companies. Worker safety and health 
recommendations were provided where 
applicable. 
 
Team 2 members were made aware of 
respiratory and dermal symptoms among 
contract workers at the U.S. Naval Air Station in 
Belle Chasse, Louisiana. Team 2 members 
collected air samples and performed noise 
monitoring on these workers actively involved 
in the repair of rooftops of four airplane hangars 
and a fire station damaged during Hurricane 
Katrina at the naval air station. Concerns were 
specifically expressed about potential fiberglass 
exposures during the removal of old rooftops. 
Sampling results and recommendations are 
provided in Summary D of the Appendix.  
Animal Shelter 
Team 2 members conducted noise monitoring at 
an outdoor animal shelter in St. Bernard Parish. 
The shelter was staffed by volunteers, some of 
whom stayed in trailers onsite. Team 2 members 
observed work practices and procedures and 
measured noise exposures on a veterinarian, a 
veterinarian assistant, and two veterinarian 
technicians for approximately 5 hours. The 
findings and recommendations from this site 
visit are summarized in Summary E of the 
Appendix. 
Union Outreach 
In an effort to reach out to unions whose 
members were likely to be conducting work in 
the hurricane-affected areas, union leaders were 
contacted to discuss ways in which the 
occupational health team members could 
provide assistance. 
 
Team 2 members discussed their availability in 
New Orleans and offered their services in 
worker safety and health guidance and exposure 
assessment to the Local 406 (Baton Rouge) 
representative of the Operating Engineers Union 
whose members were mainly performing 
infrastructure repairs such as bridge and levee 
repairs. The representative said that the union 
was sending a national hazardous materials 
(HAZMAT) Team to New Orleans and said that 
he would pass Team 2 contact information onto 
this HAZMAT Team. 
 
Team 2 members contacted a Paper, Allied-
Industrial, Chemical and Energy (PACE)/Steel 
Workers/Chemical Workers Union leader and 
discussed their availability in New Orleans. The 
representative said none of his workers were 
involved in cleaning up the contaminated areas. 
His major concerns were about process safety 
issues in the chemical plants that were going to 
be restarting over the coming weeks and months.  
  
Contact was made with Federal, state, and local 
leaders of the Communication Workers of 
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America (CWA). A conference call was held 
with two national representatives. They said that 
they had reviewed the protocol that BellSouth 
and Lucent sent them for sending people on a 
contract basis to the area to work. They agreed 
the protocols were comprehensive and properly 
included PPE and immunizations. The only 
issue the protocols did not address was training. 
The union leaders discussed this concern with 
the telephone companies who agreed to provide 
a training program for workers through the 
University of Alabama, Birmingham. The union 
leaders reported they had not heard of health 
problems and did not believe the companies 
were doing exposure monitoring. The union 
leaders were concerned that sludge/sediment 
was still inside and outside some locations 
where union members were working. The union 
leaders were concerned about subcontractors 
using immigrant labor and young workers. They 
asked us to keep them informed if Team 2 
members found mold exposures in buildings 
where their installers may have been hooking up 
communication lines. Team 2 members also 
discussed their availability in New Orleans and 
offered their services in worker safety and health 
guidance and exposure assessment to the state 
representative of the CWA. He said that 
BellSouth was taking care of their safety issues. 
They provided HAZMAT Teams to inspect 
facilities before the union workers went into 
potentially contaminated areas. He reported few 
to no complaints from the local unions in regard 
to safety issues. The local representative said he 
felt that his members were getting enough 
support for occupational safety and health from 
the contractors for whom they were working, in 
particular BellSouth. BellSouth had brought in a 
safety supervisor and was helping ensure safety 
for the CWA members.  
 
During a discussion with the regional 
representative of the Laborers Union, he 
reported that his members working with asbestos 
removal were trained on OSHA’s Hazardous 
Waste Operations and Emergency Response 
Standard (HAZWOPER).4 He relayed concerns 
about having to clean up fecal matter in the 
Superdome, but he had not heard of other 
concerns. He stated that the majority of the 
contractors were keeping a “close eye” on his 
members. A local representative said he had not 
heard of many health and safety issues for 
projects on which their members were working. 
However he knew of several problems that non-
members were involved in. One was the “hit-
and-miss attitude some worksites had in regards 
to PPE.” That is, some workers were being 
provided certain PPE and others working side-
by-side with them were not. There were sites 
where people were required to wear a half-mask 
respirator, but also required to eat and drink and 
take breaks in the same locations where they 
worked. He said he was not aware of any 
ongoing air monitoring. 
Occupational Injury and Disease 
Surveillance  
The medical officers on Team 2 advised local, 
state, and Federal officials of the potential health 
and occupational risks associated with working 
around the City of New Orleans. A site visit was 
conducted to the temporary NOPD HQ to meet 
with 35 District leaders to discuss occupational 
health risks from exposure to floodwaters, 
debris, and clean up.  
 
To determine the prevalence of occupationally-
related illness, injury, and stress, health hazard 
evaluations (HHEs) for both the NOPD and the 
New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) were 
initiated. Final reports on these evaluations are 
available separately.5,6
 
Team 2 members collected the surveillance 
sheets for illness and injury previously 
distributed by Team 1 medical officers at the 
Greyhound Bus Depot. The forms were 
incomplete and not useful in assessing illness 
and injury rates.  
 
Team 2 members developed and disseminated a 
single page information sheet for workers about 
NIOSH and the HHE program. The information 
sheet described the program and how to request 
assistance. 
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Occupational Health Team 3  
Mission: Conduct follow-up of activities begun 
by the previous Teams, focusing on outreach to 
vulnerable occupational populations and 
information dissemination. 
 
Occupational Health Team 3 was deployed to 
New Orleans between October 11 and October 
29, 2005. It increased efforts at outreach and 
information dissemination among various 
communities and workforces. Team 3 members 
assisted in completing the NOPD and NOFD 
surveys mentioned previously. 
Outreach in the Hispanic 
Community  
Hispanic immigrant workers were a large source 
of labor for many of the sub-contractors working 
in the area. Team 3 members contacted various 
leaders in the area to investigate possible means 
of outreach to this Hispanic worker population. 
Contacts were made with a local Disaster 
Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), restaurant 
and supermarket owners, radio station owners, 
and Hispanic community leaders in Kenner and 
Gonzalez, Louisiana. Occupational safety and 
health information packages were then provided 
to these contacts for distribution to the Hispanic 
worker population. One Hispanic restaurant with 
a contract to provide Hispanic workers with 
noon and evening meals agreed with a request 
from Team 3 members to add a 1-page insert to 
each meal covering occupational safety and 
health issues such as respiratory protection, 
general hygiene, ladder safety, and prophylactic 
immunizations for cuts. Approximately 20,000 
pieces of occupational safety and health 
literature was distributed to Hispanic workers. 
Outreach in the Vietnamese 
Community  
Team 3 members were joined by public health 
service officers from the Joint Field Office 
(JFO) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana to conduct 
public health/occupational safety and health 
outreach to a Vietnamese community in 
Northeast Orleans Parish. With the assistance of 
Vietnamese language skills provided by the JFO 
officers, contact was made with the pastor of 
Queen Mary Catholic Church, a Vietnamese 
congregation serving almost 3000 parishioners. 
Approximately 1200 pieces of Vietnamese-
language public health/occupational safety and 
health literature from the CDC were left with the 
pastor for distribution among his parishioners. In 
addition, a need for immunization and medical 
support for the Vietnamese community was 
identified by the pastor and was pursued by the 
JFO members of the team. The combined team 
also identified a Buddhist temple badly damaged 
by the hurricane. Although devotees had 
reportedly not returned to the area, successful 
telephone contacts with temple leaders were 
established to distribute Vietnamese-language 
occupational safety and health literature to 
devotees. 
Outreach to Health Care and 
Emergency Services Personnel 
A Team 3 member was the keynote speaker at 
an Ochsner Clinic Health Fair in New Orleans. 
The presentation included general information 
about respirator use and other types of personal 
protection. The second speaker was a 
representative of the 3M Company, which 
provided cleaning kits (including three N-95 
respirators, hand disinfectant, sponge, and 
wound protector) to the attendees. The 
presentations were available by videoconference 
to two other Ochsner facilities. 
 
Team 3 members also provided educational 
materials to the staff at the Red Cross/FEMA 
tent. Remaining educational materials were 
given to the Billy Graham Disaster Team who 
promised to distribute the information to people 
working in their houses. 
Outreach at Job Fairs 
Over the course of two days, Team 3 members 
reached out to 24 employers and about 100 
prospective employees at a local job fair in St. 
Bernard Parish. Team 3 members provided 
information on worker health and safety for 
residents returning home and demonstrated the 
correct way of donning respirators and how to 
choose the right type of respirator. Team 3 
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members also met the director of homeland 
security and emergency preparedness for St. 
Bernard Parish who noted that they did not have 
respirators for returning residents and that all 
resources they requested were being diverted to 
New Orleans. Returning residents also 
complained of lack of access to respirators and 
lack of information on potential hazards and the 
types of PPE needed.  
Mold Remediation 
A site visit was conducted by Team 3 members 
at the St. Bernard’s Parish Courthouse in 
Chalmette, Louisiana in response to concerns 
about mold remediation efforts. The members 
discussed the status of these efforts and future 
plans with the Project Manager for Advanced 
Cleanup Technology, Inc. and conducted a 
walk-through tour of the courthouse and an 
adjacent building. They discussed 
recommendations for employee training and 
their use of personal protective equipment and 
why environmental sampling was not 
recommended (Summary F in the Appendix).   
Asbestos 
Team 3 members were contacted regarding 
concerns about dust (possibly containing 
asbestos) and dried flood sediment levels in a 
Red Cross warehouse. Reportedly, one of the 
workers recently had seen a physician because 
of respiratory irritation possibly associated with 
working at the warehouse; reportedly, the 
physician told him that he had asbestosis. Team 
3 members were asked if there was evidence of 
asbestos in the warehouse, if it was possible that 
this worker developed asbestosis if he only 
worked in this warehouse for several days, and if 
air samples for asbestos should be collected in 
the warehouse. 
 
A visual inspection was conducted at the 
warehouse for potential asbestos-containing 
materials. Team 3 members found no source 
materials that would suggest workers were 
potentially exposed to asbestos at the worksite. 
No fire retardant materials were observed that 
could be a source of asbestos (the ceiling was 
exposed plywood). Pipes hanging from the 
ceiling and along the warehouse walls were not 
insulated. Furthermore, the walls throughout the 
warehouse were cement. Debris piles from roof 
demolition appeared to contain wood debris, 
asphalt/fiberglass roofing material, and dirt. 
Additionally, the building owner/operator 
reported the building did not contain asbestos. 
Because there were no observable sources of 
asbestos during our walk-through inspection of 
the building, it was determined there was no 
justification to sample the air for asbestos. 
 
Information was provided on the chronic, slowly 
progressive nature of asbestosis, seen most often 
in workers who manufacture or use asbestos 
products and who have been exposed to high 
levels of asbestos. Team 3 members described 
how asbestosis is not a condition that develops 
over the course of several days, but rather that 
the first signs of disease can be 15–30 years after 
the exposure. 
 
Ongoing repair of the warehouse roof was 
observed. The work area in the warehouse was 
dusty during the site visit and could potentially 
cause respiratory irritation. It was reported that 
dust masks were offered to the workers but they 
chose not to wear them. Team 3 members were 
uncertain of the exact type of respirators offered. 
However, because the remaining supplies still 
needed to be removed from the building 
requiring workers to return to the warehouse, 
recommendations to minimize dust exposure 
were provided. These included wet mopping, 
rather than dry sweeping the floor prior to 
removal of supplies, accessing the supplies from 
the back dock rather than entering the larger area 
of the warehouse where the roof repair work was 
being performed; using a battery-powered pallet 
jack or hand pallet jack to move the supplies 
because the exhaust from a motorized fork lift 
may disturb any dust present on the floor; and 
using a damp cloth to wipe the dust from the 
supplies rather than using compressed air. 
Louisiana Department of Health 
and Hospitals Team 
CDC/NIOSH occupational health specialists 
assisted the Louisiana Department of Health and 
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Hospitals (LDHH) regarding worker health, 
safety, and exposure issues. The initial 
CDC/NIOSH team for the LDHH, Louisiana 
Office of Public Health, Environmental 
Epidemiology & Toxicology (EE&T) consisted 
of an administrative assistant, public health 
advisor, health educator, occupational health 
physician, and industrial hygienist. Subsequent 
CDC teams included occupational and 
environmental health support from the Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Diseases Registry 
(ATSDR) and NIOSH. The purpose of the teams 
were to provide technical support to the LDHH 
employees in the EE&T office, which was 
responsible for the toll-free number relating to 
environmental health issues, health issues 
dealing with hazardous exposures (including the 
Superfund sites in New Orleans), and indoor 
environmental quality. The team attended daily 
JFO and State EPA meetings to gather 
information for the state health representative; 
set-up communication on a daily basis with the 
environmental team in New Orleans; and review 
environmental health data on sludge, air, and 
water contamination in New Orleans and for 
Lake Pontchartrain. The team developed 
information handouts on safe entry and mold 
and helped get the pamphlets printed and taken 
to New Orleans for distribution with help from 
the CDC Foundation. Other tasks included 
answering public inquires, supporting state 
officials with policy statements dealing with 




During the time spent in the New Orleans area in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, several 
themes emerged regarding occupational health 
and safety of response, rescue, and recovery 
workers. One was the recognition that, while the 
devastation in New Orleans may have been on a 
much larger scale than previous hurricanes and 
floods, many of the issues faced were, in fact, 
similar to past incidences of flooding elsewhere. 
In particular, concerns regarding health effects 
due to mold exposures in flooded homes and 
businesses were commonly brought to the 
attention of Occupational Health Team 
members. In addition to mold, concerns of 
exposures to harmful chemical and biological 
agents were abundant. The importance of 
information readily accessible and 
understandable by the workers and the public 
regarding these issues was apparent throughout 
the response.  
 
While environmental sampling by Occupational 
Health Team members typically did not reveal 
contaminant levels above recognized 
occupational exposure limits (see Appendix for 
summaries of results from individual sites), the 
ability and capacity of employers and employees 
to recognize and evaluate these hazards was 
quite variable. The USACE major contractors 
and subcontractors with whom the Occupational 
Health Team members met had varying degrees 
of capacity for hazard recognition, evaluation, 
and control. It is imperative to develop the 
capacity of contractors to safeguard the safety 
and health of their workers prior to such work so 
that they can successfully implement effective 
programs during often chaotic disaster 
conditions.  
 
Occupational safety hazards were evident during 
hurricane cleanup and recovery activities. The 
unions, in particular, expressed concerns over 
unaddressed safety issues to Occupational 
Health Team members. Oftentimes, it appeared 
that safety violations were committed in the rush 
of contractors to do as much work as possible in 
the shortest amount of time. This included 
common violations such as overloading trucks 
and hauling debris without tarps so that large 
chunks of debris (entire mattresses, dressers, 
large pieces of metal) fell from the trucks; 
traveling too fast at or near debris dump sites; 
and lack of professional safety staff and other 
resources on site. For example, a day after a visit 
to a debris transfer/dump site by Occupational 
Health Team members where safety hazards 
were evident, a flagman was killed after being 
trapped under the left track of a bulldozer. 
OSHA and USACE conducted investigations of 
the fatality. This example shows the need for 
qualified safety professionals as a key 
component of companies’ occupational health 
program for work in disaster areas. 
 
 
Cooperation between occupational safety and 
health staff of the various governmental 
agencies involved (i.e., OSHA, NIOSH, 
USACE) and the main contractor/subcontractors 
is essential for future emergencies. The Worker 
Safety and Health Annex of the Emergency 
Support Function 8 (ESF-8), which is in the 
National Response Plan, was put into effect for 
the first time during Hurricane Katrina. This 
annex describes the responsibilities OSHA has 
to provide assistance to Federal employees and 
their contractors during disaster recovery 
operations, as well as the support role NIOSH 
plays to OSHA during such a response. 
Occupational Health Team members developed 
relationships with OSHA counterparts in New 
Orleans, as well as with safety and health staff 
among the main contractors to the USACE. 
Building on these relationships and making 
changes in response to lessons learned will be 
important for enhancing Federal response efforts 
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 Health complaints or diagnoses occurring five or more times in the 150 employees of a private security 
company working in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina (September 3–27, 2005) 
 
 
Diagnosis or Presenting  
Complaint 
Number Seen for This Reason 
(% out of 267 total clinic visits) 
Laceration (Fingers/Hand) 37 (14.0) 
Sinus Congestion 27 (10.0) 
Emotional Distress 25 (9.3) 
Insect Bites/Sting 21 (7.8) 
Laceration (All Other) 17 (6.3) 
Headache 15 (5.6) 
Nausea 10 (3.7) 
Heat Exhaustion 9   (3.3) 
Eye Irritation 8   (3.0) 
Abrasion 8   (3.0) 
Diarrhea 7   (2.6) 
Skin Rash 7   (2.6) 
Dehydration 7   (2.6) 
Blisters (Feet) 7   (2.6) 
Sore Throat 6   (2.2) 
Excessive Noise Exposure 6   (2.2) 
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Page 16  Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2005-0369-3034 
Summaries of Individual Sites Evaluated 
 
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - A 
CERES Environmental/Beverly Construction Airport Debris Site,  
New Orleans, Louisiana 
 
Investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) evaluated job hazards on 
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What NIOSH Did 
 We watched work processes and practices. 
 We took three personal breathing zone (PBZ) air 
samples for total dust and metals, eight PBZ air 
samples for respirable dust and silica, seven PBZ 
air samples for asbestos and other fibers and one 
bulk sample of the debris pile for metals, silica, 
and asbestos. 
 We measured noise exposures on a bulldozer 
operator, a team leader who was passing out 
tickets to trucks, and a backhoe operator. 
 
What NIOSH Found 
 PBZ samples for total dust were below the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) permissible exposure limit (PEL).  
 Lead, arsenic, and manganese concentrations 
were very low or nondetectable. 
 PBZ samples for respirable dust were below the 
OSHA PEL. Two of the samples contained 
levels of quartz below the OSHA PEL. None of 
the samples contained cristobalite. 
PBZ samples for fibers were below the OSHA 
PEL for asbestos. The types of fibers identified 
 
 lead, 
and arsenic, were found in the bulk sample. 
were mainly cellulose/plant fibers and fiberglass. 
Low levels of metals such as manganese, 
 The bulk sample contained 12% quartz; asbestos 
was not detected. 
 Noise exposures for the team leader exceeded 
the NIOSH Recommended Exposure Limit 
(REL) dose of 100%. The REL dose for the 
backhoe operator was 98.5%. Exposures for both 
were below the OSHA criteria. Results are not 




 Enforce traffic rules on the site. 
 Restrict flagmen from the dumping area. 
 Provide sanitary facilities for hand washing. 
Provide an area (for example, a tent) for 
employees to change into and out of protective 
 
 
 el posts set in concrete) to 
 trucks. 
 
asks vary. Respirator 
use should follow OSHA regulations even if 
ntary
clothing. Ideally, a shower facility should be 
available. 
Make hearing protection devices such as ear 
plugs available to the workers and enforce their 
use. 
Use barriers (e.g., ste
help protect the USACE personnel who work 
near moving
 Use water sprays regularly to reduce airborne 
dust levels. 
Continue to assess the need for respirators as the 
debris composition and t




W : hat tion To Do For More Informa
For m one ore information about the sampling d
on this site visit, contact NIOSH at 
(513)-841-4382 and ask for 
Hurricane Katrina Response Support  
 
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - B 
North Galvez and St. Louis Streets Debris Site,  
New Orleans, Louisiana 
 
On October 4, 2005, investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) evaluated job hazards at a debris site located on North Galvez Street in New Orleans, Louisiana. 
At this site, green debris (branches, trees shrubs, etc.) were compiled and mulched for transport to 







 d recommendations for employee 





 We watched work processes and practices. 
We took one personal breathing zone (PBZ) 
and three area air samples for total dust and 
metals. 
 We took two area air samples for respirable 
dust and silica. 
 We took two bulk samples of the soil to screen 
for metals, crystalline silica, and asbestos. 
We measured noise exposures on a quality 




What NIOSH Found 
Workers were requir
 
 ed to wear hard hats, 
 
Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure 
Limit (PEL). 
f the bulk samples contained 





breathable coveralls, and N-95 filtering 
facepiece respirators. 
Total dust concentration was below the 
Occupational Safety and Health 
 Airborne lead, arsenic, and manganese 
concentrations were very low or 
nondetectable. 
 Respirable dust concentrations were below the 
OSHA PEL. 
 Neither of the respirable dust samples 
contained silica (quartz or cristobalite). 
 Low levels of metals such as manganese, lead 





Noise exposures on the QC inspector and the 
trackhoe operator/foreman were bel
criteria for the time sa
Recommendations 
 Continue to use hard hats, breathable 
coveralls, and safety glasses. 
Continue to assess the need for respirators as 





e should follow OSHA 




Wha on: t To Do For More Informati
For m one ore information about the sampling d
on this site visit, contact NIOSH at  
(513)-841-4382 and ask for  
Hurricane Katrina Response Support 
 




CD C C/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - 
Religious and Broad Streets Debris Site,  
New Orleans, Louisiana 
 
On October 10, 2005, investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) assessed potential job hazards at a debris site located at Religious and Broad Streets in New 
Orleans, Louisiana. The site was run through a subcontract of ECC. Investigators conducted air sampling 
on personnel actively involved in the disposal of a pile of suspected Transite™ material found among 
debris from Hurricane Katrina. Concerns were specifically expressed about potential asbestos fiber 
exposures during this activity. Transite™ is a fire-proofing material used in roofing and siding that used 
ade with asbestos; modern-day Transite™ is not made with asbestos.  to be m
 
 
What NIOSH Did 
 
ted Transite™ material 
to a lined dumpster. 
 
 
 We watched work practices and procedures. 
We took three personal breathing zone 
(PBZ) air samples and one area air sample 
for asbestos and other fibers during the 
transfer of the suspec




 tified were cellulose, not 
asbestos fibers.  
 
The fiber concentration on the area 
sample was below the limit of detection.  
The fiber concentrations on two of the three 
PBZ samples were non-detectable. The third 
PBZ sample, taken on a trackhoe o





 Transite™, which 
 
 prevent fibers from 
 
en if management allows 
voluntary use. 
 
Although asbestos exposure was not 
identified during this assessment, conditions 
and materials may vary at other times and 
worksites. Train employees on the hazards 
associated with handling siding and roofing 
materials, such as old
may contain asbestos.  
 Use water sprays to suppress dust. 
Avoid crushing, grinding, or breaking old 
Transite™ or other materials that may 
contain asbestos to
becoming airborne. 
Continue to assess the need for respirators as 
the debris composition and tasks vary. 






What To Do For More Information: 
For more information about the sampling done 
on this site visit, contact NIOSH at  
(513)-841-4382 and ask for  
Hurricane Katrina Response Support 
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For more information about the sampling done at this 
site visit, contact NIOSH at (513) 841-4382 and ask 
for Hurricane Katrina response support. 
 
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - D 
Assessment of Occu . Naval Air Station, pational Hazards at a U.S
 Belle Chasse, Louisiana 
 
Investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) evaluated job 
hazards on October 9 and 10, 2005, at a U.S. Naval Air Station in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. The workers 
y the Young Group. were employed b
 
 
What NIOSH Did 
 
 We watched work processes and practices. 
Took three personal breathing zone (PBZ) 
air samples for fiberglass, nine PBZ air 
samples for total dust, and two bulk samples 
 
 ures on a forklift 
operator and four roofers. 
 
of old roofing material and roof debris for 
asbestos. 
We measured noise expos
What NIOSH Found 
 
 
 and Health 
Limit (PEL).  
 




 Fiberglass concentrations were very low or 
nondetectable. 
Total dust concentrations were below the 
Occupational Safety
Administration (OSHA) Permissible 
Exposure 
 Asbestos was not detected in the bulk 
samples. 
Noise exposures for the forklift operator 
exceeded the NIOSH Recommended 
Exposure Limit (REL) dose of 100%. The 
e roofers were below 
100%. All n  measurements were below 
Recommendations 
 
 Continue to wear hard hats when working 
on the roof. 
 Continue to drink fluids regularly to stay 
hydrated. 
 Wear long sleeve shirts and safety glasses 
when tearing up old roofs. 
ay.  Take a shower at the end of the d
 Do not smoke in the workplace. 
Enforce use of hearing protectors for the 
forklift operator; reevaluate noise exposures 
on roofers when the work rate increases or 
when roof 
 
surfaces are different from those 
 
s even if 




Continue to assess the need for respirators as 
the intensity of tasks increases. Respirator 







W  ha on:t To Do For More Informati
For one more information about the sampling d
on this site visit, contact NIOSH at  
(513)-841-4382 and ask for  
Hurricane Katrina Response Support. 
 




CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - E 
Evaluation of Noise Exposures at an Animal Shelter, 
 St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana 
 
Investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducted noise 
monitoring at an outdoor animal shelter in St. Bernard Parish. The shelter was staffed by volunteers, some 
of whom stayed in trailers onsite. Monitoring was carried out on October 3 and 4, 2005. 
 
What NIOSH Did 




rate, and the OSHA criteria are based on a 5-
dB excha L is more 
conservative than the OSHA criteria. 
 We took nine instantaneous readings of 
noise levels at the dog tent.  
We measured noise exposures on a 
veterinarian, a veterinarian assistant, and 
two veterinary technicians for approximately 
5 hours.  
 Personal exposures are expressed as a dose 
percent, where the maximum allowable dose 
is 100%.  
The doses are expressed as NIOSH 
Recommended Exposure Limit (REL) and 
the OSHA Action Level (AL). The NIOSH 
REL is based on a 3-decibel (dB) exc
nge rate. The NIOSH RE
 
What NIOSH Found 
 The noise levels at the dog tent ranged from 





workers a hearing 
conservati
 
 A-weighted scale. 
The veterinarian had a dose of 128% as
calculated by the REL and a dose of 36% as 
calculated by the AL for the time sampled.  
The veterinary assistant had a dose of 136%  
as calculated by the REL and 36% as 
calculated by the AL for the time sampled.  
The two technicians had doses of 199% and 
337% respectively, as calculated by the 
REL, and a corresponding dose of 42% and 
63%, as calculated by the AL.  
The noise exposure on one of the 
technicians exceeded the OSHA Action 
Level of 50% dose, which would re
to be placed in 




  regularly conduct 
similar activities, in an HCP as specified by 




Provide volunteers with hearing protectors 
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What To Do For More Information: 
For more information about the sampling done  
on this site visit, contact NIOSH at  
(513) 841-4382 and ask for  
Hurricane Katrina Response Support. 
 
CDC/NIOSH Hurricane Katrina Response - F 
Evaluation of the St. Bernard Parish Courthouse 
 
On October 13, 2005, a site visit was conducted by investigato nal Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (N St. Bernard’s Parish Co
discussed the ediation efforts and fu re
l a walk-through tour adjacent building. No 
n
 
rs from the Natio
IOSH) at the 
status of current rem
urthouse in Chalmette, Louisiana. Investigators 
tu  plans with the Project Manager for Advanced 
of the courthouse and an C eanup Technology, Inc. and conducted 
e vironmental sampling was conducted.  
 
 We conducted a walk-through tour of the facility. 
 We discussed r aining and 
their use of p
 
 s. 
 ation efforts for porous surfaces were in the 
 
were not disassembled during initial remediation efforts. 
 Cleaning within pipe cha
autions regar
and confined space 
 Rooms with significant pa
and similar furnishings showed s
 Some “cleaned” rooms 
growth along fibrous ceiling tiles,
items. 
 Some content removal activities attributed to work by Army 








 been wet for more than 48 hours. 
 Porous items should not be returned to building unless they 
can be thoroughly cleaned and dried.  
 Courtrooms with raised sub-floor areas should be partially 
disassembled and evaluated for remediation options. 
emediate nd air 
ning systems prior to re-occupancy. 
Provide an area (for example, a tent) for employees to change 




ecommendations for employee tr
ersonal protective equipment. 
 We discussed why environmental sampling was not 
recommended. 
We checked portions of the false ceiling, pipe chase, and 
ventilation systems for mold contamination and flood 
residue. 
We provided recommendations regarding cleanup activitie
 Remediation and cleaning procedures for courthouse rooms 
with non-porous surfaces appeared to be progressing 
appropriately and effectively.  
Remedi
beginning stages. 
Courtrooms utilizing raised sub-floors for elevated seating 
se and electrical closets may require 
ding de-energizing electrical panels  Rspecial prec
entry requirements for pipe chase areas. 
per, carpet, pressboard furniture, 
conditio
 
ignificant mold growth. 
showed persistent or new mold 
 or on furniture and storage 
should be availabl
 
Portions of some heating, refrigerating, and air conditioning 
systems showed signs of internal contamination and 
subsequent spore redistri
 Ensure all workers involved in mold remediation activities 
have received sufficient training to understand the hazards 
presented by the mold, the cleaning agents, and the 
remediation processes.  
Ensure that all workers involved in mold remediation are 
equipped with appropriate personal protective equip
(skin, eye, respiratory protection).  
Follow OSHA requirements for use of respirators, including 
fit-testing, medical clearance and establishing a written 
respiratory protection program. 
Remove all porous items (paper, drywall, car
padding, upholstery, wallpaper, ceiling tiles, insulation 
material, some clothing, leather, paper, wood ) that are 
contaminated or have
What NIOSH Did 
and clean the heating, ventilation, a
What NIOSH Found 
Recommendations 
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What To Do For More Information: 
For more information about the sampling done 
on this site visit, contact NIOSH at  
(513) 841-4382 and ask for  
Hurricane Katrina Response Support. 
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To receive NIOSH documents or information 
about occupational safety and health topics 
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1-800-35-NIOSH (356-4674) 
Fax: 1-513-533-8573  
E-mail: pubstaft@cdc.gov 
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